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Peace - Badges - Activism

Trident do Texas Instruments Inc

Trident do Texas Instruments Inc is a satirical pin badge that weaponises a major corporate scandal to expose the faulty wiring of the Cold War machine.

A corporate logo for the bomb

The badge is designed to look like a piece of cheap corporate merchandise. Against a pale yellow background, the word TRIDENT is printed in a heavy, black, sans-serif font. Tucked underneath, as if a corporate slogan, are the words do Texas Instruments Inc.

The text sits above a stark, red illustration of a mushroom cloud. The design collapses the distance between an air-conditioned Texas laboratory and the blast zone of a submarine-launched missile.

The scandal of the untested chips

In late 1984, the U.S. Department of Defense uncovered a deep flaw at the heart of its military hardware. Texas Instruments, a primary defence contractor, had failed to perform the required military-specification testing on an estimated 15 million microchips.

These components were not sitting in a warehouse; they had already been soldered into the circuit boards of American weapons systems, from aircraft to the guidance systems of the Trident nuclear missile. The brains of the machine were unverified.

A joke with a terrifying glitch

The slogan printed across the mushroom cloud, 15 Million microchips can't be wrong, is a dark piece of satire. It twists a well-known phrase, popularised by the Elvis Presley album "50 Million Elvis Fans Can't Be Wrong," to mock the logic of the arms race. But the joke had a terrifyingly literal edge. The entire point of the protest was that these specific 15 million chips could be wrong.

Activists seized on the scandal to highlight the absurd fragility of the machinery of global annihilation. A single faulty, untested chip could potentially trigger an automated, accidental launch.

From Texas to the peace camps

The badge connected a corporate failure in Dallas to the mud of the peace camps in Britain. For anti-Trident protesters blockading bases like Faslane in Scotland, the scandal handed them a ready-made argument. It showed that the nuclear deterrent was not a stable, perfectly engineered system, but a dangerously unreliable machine built by a contractor cutting corners.

Trident do Texas Instruments Inc pins the blame for this risk not on an abstract political theory, but directly onto the company that made the parts. It remains a small, tin-plate record of a moment when the mask of corporate reliability slipped, revealing the flawed wiring underneath.